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Abstract
Consistent confirmations obtained independently of each other lend credibility to a scientific result. We refer
to results satisfying this consistency as reproducible and assume that reproducibility is a desirable property
of scientific discovery. Yet seemingly science also progresses despite irreproducible results, indicating that the
relationship between reproducibility and other desirable properties of scientific discovery is not well understood.
These properties include early discovery of truth, persistence on truth once it is discovered, and time spent on
truth in a long-term scientific inquiry. We build a mathematical model of scientific discovery that presents a
viable framework to study its desirable properties including reproducibility. In this framework, we assume that
scientists adopt a model-centric approach to discover the true model generating data in a stochastic process of
scientific discovery. We analyze the properties of this process using Markov chain theory, Monte Carlo methods,
and agent-based modeling. We show that the scientific process may not converge to truth even if scientific
results are reproducible and that irreproducible results do not necessarily imply untrue results. The proportion
of different research strategies represented in the scientific population, scientists’ choice of methodology, the
complexity of truth, and the strength of signal contribute to this counter-intuitive finding. Important insights
include that innovative research speeds up the discovery of scientific truth by facilitating the exploration of
model space and epistemic diversity optimizes across desirable properties of scientific discovery.
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Author summary
We mathematically model a virtual scientific community to understand how reproducibility is related to scientific
discovery of truth. Studying this community over time, we find that irreproducible results may not be untrue
and reproducible results do not guarantee that the scientific process will converge to truth. A combination of
research strategies, statistical methods, and the state of truth explains this finding. We show that innovative
research speeds up the discovery of truth and that the pursuit of diverse research approaches in the scientific
population optimizes across desirable properties of scientific discovery.
Introduction
Consistent confirmations obtained independently of each other lend credibility to a scientific result [1–4]. We
refer to this notion of multiple confirmations as reproducibility of scientific results. Ioannidis [5] argued that
a research claim is more likely to be false than true, partly due to the prevalent use of statistical significance
and null hypothesis significance testing as method of inference. Recent theoretical research explored aspects
of scientific practice contributing to irreproducibility. McElreath and Smaldino [6] modeled a population of
scientists testing a variety of hypotheses and tracking positive and negative published findings to investigate how
the evidential value of replication studies changed with the base rate of true hypotheses, statistical power, and
false positive rate. Other studies found that current incentive structures may lead to degradation of scientific
practice [7, 8]. Publication bias was also proposed to contribute to the transitioning of incorrect findings from
claim to fact [9]. These studies focus on how structural incentives and questionable research practices (QRPs)
influence reproducibility of scientific results within a hypothesis-centric framework, and how to improve statistical
practices and publication norms to increase reproducibility. Under limitations of hypothesis testing [10], however,
understanding salient properties of the scientific process is challenging, especially for fields that progress by
building, comparing, selecting, and re-building models.
In this work, we make three contributions to the literature on meta-research. First, we present a model-centric
mathematical framework modeling scientists’ convergence to truth in the process of scientific discovery. We
identify, mathematically define and study the relationship between key properties of this process such as early
discovery of truth, persistence on truth once it is discovered, time spent on truth in a long-term scientific
inquiry, and rate of reproducibility. Second, in a system without QRPs or structural incentives, we study how
the diversity of research strategies in the scientific population, the complexity of truth, and the noise-to-signal
ratio in the true data generating model affect these properties. Third, we study the scientific process where
scientists engage in model comparison instead of statistical hypothesis testing. Model comparison aims to select
a useful model that approximates the true model generating the data and it has long been a cornerstone in many
scientific disciplines because of its generality. Our model-centric view allows us to study the process of scientific
discovery under uncertainty, bypassing the complications inherited from hypothesis testing [10].
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A model-centric meta-scientific framework
We adopt a notion of confirmation of results in idealized experiments and build a mathematical framework of
scientific discovery based on this notion.
Model, idealized experiment, replication experiment, and reproducibility. We let K be the
background knowledge on a natural phenomenon of interest, M be a prediction in the form of a probability
model parameterized by θ ∈ Θ, that is in principle testable using observables, and D be the data generated by
the true model. The degree of confirmation of M by D is assessed by S, a fixed and known method. We define
ξ, an idealized experiment, as (M, θ,D, S,K).
In an idealized experiment ξ, the data D confirms the model M if P(M |D,K) > P(M |K), where P(M |D,K)
and P(M |K) are probabilities of M after and before observing the data, respectively. By Bayes’s Theorem,
P(M |D,K)/P(M |K) is proportional to the likelihood P(D|M,K). Large P(D|M,K) implies high degree of
confirmation of M . Complex models, however, have a tendency to inflate P(D|M,K) and hence P(M |D,K). As
a measure against overfitting, modern model comparison statistics S are not only based on P (D|M,K) but also
penalize the complexity of M to prevent inflating the likelihood under complex models. For several well-known
S, smaller S(M) means the model M is more favorable in a set of models, and we follow this convention here.
In a scientific inquiry, a novel prediction is often tested against a status quo consensus. We formulate this
situation by denoting the novel prediction as a proposed model MP which is tested against the global model MG,
the scientific consensus. Conditional on the data, S(MP ) < S(MG) means that the proposed model is more
favorable than MG. In this case, MP becomes the new scientific consensus, otherwise the global model remains
as the scientific consensus.
The description of scientific inquiry given in the last paragraph and reproducibility of results in a replication
experiment as follows. If ξ1 given by (MP , θ,D1, S,K1) is tested against MG, then the experiment ξ2 immediately
following ξ1 is a replication experiment for ξ1 if and only if ξ2 is given by (MP , θ,D2, S,K2) and it is tested against
the same MG as ξ1. That is, the replication experiment proposes the same model, uses the same methods, and is
tested against the same global model as the original experiment. Of two elements that differ between the original
experiment and the replication experiment, the first is D2, which is the data that is generated in the replication
experiment independent of the data D1 of the original experiment. The second is the background information
K2 which includes all the information necessary to replicate ξ1. In particular, K2 includes the knowledge that
MP was the proposed model in ξ1, it was tested against MG, and the outcome of this test—whether MP was
updated to consensus or MG remained as the consensus. We say that the replication experiment ξ2 reproduces the
results of ξ1 if the results of ξ1 and ξ2 are the same in terms of updating the consensus. There are two mutually
exclusive ways that ξ2 can reproduce the results of ξ1: 1) If the proposed model in ξ1 won against the global
model, then this must also be the case in ξ2, that is S(MP ) < S(MG) in both experiments. 2) If the proposed
model in ξ1 lost against the global model, then this must also be the case in ξ2, that is S(MP ) > S(MG) in
both experiments. Otherwise, we say that ξ2 fails to reproduce the results of ξ1. These definitions of replication
experiment and reproducibility of results formalize necessary open science practices for potential reproducibility
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of results: Information about the proposed and global models in the original experiment and the results of this
experiment which we capture by K2 must be transferred to ξ2.
Stochastic process of scientific discovery. We assume an infinite population of scientists who conduct a
sequence of idealized experiments to find the true model generating the data (see S1 Appendix for mathematical
framework). In the population, we consider various types of scientists, each with a mathematically well-defined
research strategy for proposing models. Scientists search for a true model in a set of linear models. Linear
models were chosen because they can accommodate a variety of designs with straightforward statistical analysis,
and their complexity is mathematically tractable (S2 Appendix). We define model complexity as a function
of the number of model parameters and interaction terms, and visualize it by representing each model with a
unique geometry on an equilateral hexagon inscribed in its tangent circle (Fig. 1A).
We assume a discrete time process with t = 0, 1, · · · , where at each time step an experiment ξ(t) is conducted
by a scientist randomly selected from a population of scientists with equal probability. The experiment entails
proposing a model M
(t)
P as a candidate for the true data generating mechanism. The probability of proposing
a particular model is determined by the scientist’s research strategy and the global model M
(t)
G —the current
scientific consensus. The scientist compares the global model against the proposed model using new data D(t)
generated from the true model and a model comparison statistic S. The model with favorable statistic is set as
the global model for the next time step M
(t+1)
G . Because the probability of proposing a model is independent of
the past and the transition from M
(t)
G to M
(t+1)
G admits the (first order) Markov property, the stochastic process
representing the scientific process is a Markov chain. This mechanism represents how scientific consensus is
updated in light of new evidence. We study the mathematical properties of this process for different scientist
populations representing a variety of research strategies.
Introducing replication experiments to the process fundamentally alters the probability mechanism of updating
global models: By definition, a replication experiment depends on the experiment conducted at the previous time
step via K2. Hence the stochastic process is a higher order Markov chain (see [11]) and we turn to an agent-based
model (ABM) [12,13] to analyze the process with replication. Our ABM is a forward-in-time, simulation-based,
individual-level implementation of the scientific process where agents represent scientists (S3 Algorithm).
We assume that reproducibility is a desirable property of scientific discovery. However, arguably early
discovery of truth, persistence on truth once it is discovered, and long time spent on truth in a long-term
scientific inquiry are also desirable properties of scientific discovery since they would characterize a resource
efficient and epistemically accurate scientific process. We seek insight into the drivers of these properties and the
relationship among them, which we motivate with the following questions (see S4 Appendix for mathematical
definitions). How quickly does scientific community discover the true model? We assess this property by the
mean first passage time to the true model and view it as a key indicator of resource efficiency in the process of
scientific discovery. How “sticky” is the true model as global model? We define the stickiness of the true model
as the mean probability of staying in the true model once it becomes global model. How long does scientific
community stay on the true model? The stationary probability that the true model is global model has the
interpretation of the long-term stay of the scientific community on the true model. How reproducible are the
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Fig 1. (A) Each column of the matrix indicates the terms included in the model shown by a symbol at the
bottom of the column. For example, the fifth column denotes the model y = β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 + , and is
represented by three corners of hexagon connected with two lines. TM1, TM2, TM3 are the three true models
used in our agent-based model simulations. Symbols representing each model are ordered from simple to
complex, left to right. Symbols are used as y-axis labels for heat maps in (B) and (C). Stickiness of each true
model as a global model for each scientist population under AIC (B) and SC (C).
results of experiments? We track replication experiments to calculate the rate of reproducibility when the true
model is global model, as well as when it is not. We study the answers to these questions as a function of
the following aspects of model-centric approach to scientific discovery: the proportion of research strategies in
the scientific population, the complexity of the true model generating the data, the ratio of error variance to
deterministic expectation in the true model (i.e., noise-to-signal ratio), and the model comparison statistic.
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Scientist types. We include distinct research strategies to explore the effect of epistemic diversity in the
scientific population. We define simple research strategies where our scientists do not have a memory of their
past decisions and they do not interact directly with each other, but only via the global model. Nonetheless,
the research strategies we include in our model seem reasonably realistic to us in capturing the essence of some
well-known research approaches. Figure 2 illustrates our stochastic process of scientific discovery for a specific
scientist population.
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Fig 2. A transition of our process of scientific discovery for an epistemically diverse population with replicator.
A scientist (Bo) is chosen uniformly randomly from the population (1). Given the global model, the set of
proposal models and their probabilities (given in percentage points inside models) are determined. In this
population with no replicator, Bo proposes only models formed by adding an interaction (2). The proposed
model selected (3) and the data generated from the true model (4) are used with the model comparison statistic
(SC or AIC) to update the global model (5).
For the process with no replication, we define three types of scientists: Tess, Mave, Bo (S5 Appendix). Tess,
the theory tester, uniformly randomly selects a proposal model that is only one main effect predictor away from
the current global model. We impose a hierarchical constraint on interaction terms in the sense that when Tess
proposes to drop a predictor from the current global model, all higher order interactions including this term
are dropped too. We think of Tess’ strategy as a refinement of an existing theory by testing current consensus
against models that are close to it. Mave, the maverick does not build off of the current consensus but she
ignores it. She advances novel ideas and uniformly randomly selects a model from the set of all models. The
novelty-seeking aspect of her strategy is similar to a maverick strategy proposed in prior research on epistemic
landscapes and the division of cognitive labor [14–16]. However, in contrast to that strategy, Mave does not
actively aim to avoid previously tested models and she acts independently of the current scientific consensus.
Bo, the boundary tester systematically tests the boundaries of the current global model. She selects a model
that adds interactions to the current global model to explore the conditions under which the current global
model holds. After her, if the tested boundary has been confirmed by the data, the global model may earn a
new predictor representing a main interaction and the lower order interactions associated with it that are not
currently in the model. If the tested boundary has not been confirmed by the data, the global model does not
change.
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For the process with replication, we introduce Rey, the replicator who conducts a replication experiment
which is the exact same experiment conducted by her precedent, but with new data. She reproduces the results
of the preceding experiment if she confirms as global model the same model confirmed as global model by her
precedent. Thus, Rey compares the same pair of proposed model (MP ) and global model (MG) as that of her
predecessor, using new data, and the replication is successful if two conditions are satisfied: 1) either the results
of her predecessor and the replication experiment are both judged favorable against the global model (MG), or
they both are not, leaving scientific consensus unchanged, 2) sufficient information about the the result of her
predecessor’s experiment is available through the background knowledge of the replication experiment to assess
if the first condition holds. This second condition implies that a replication experiment requires open science
practices for transferring sufficient information about the experiment in the previous time step to the replication
experiment in order for the latter to assess the reproducibility of the result.
Scientist populations. We assess the effect of each strategy by considering populations of scientists in
which Rey, Tess, Bo, and Mave are represented at varying proportions (S6 Table). Of particular interest to us
are homogeneous populations where the dominant scientist type comprises 99% of the scientist population and
epistemically diverse populations where all scientist types are represented in equal proportion.
Accumulation of evidence. The background knowledge that a scientist brings to an experiment consist
of the global model, all other models in the system, predictors, and their parameters as well as the results from
the previous experiment if the current experiment is a replication experiment. Scientific evidence in our model
accumulates through experiments and all the evidence is counted at the end of a long run. Data set in each
experiment has a weight of one and the sample proportion of experiments which reproduce a result converges to
the true value of reproducibility rate by the Law of Large Numbers.
Model comparison criteria. We adopt two well-known likelihood-based criteria for model comparison
and show how these interact with the behavior of scientists in the population: the Schwarz Criterion (SC) [17]
and the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) [20,21]. A smaller value of these statistics indicate a better model
performance than a larger value. When the true model generating the data is in the universe of candidate
models, SC is statistically consistent and selects the true model with probability 1 as n→∞ (S5 Appendix).
Maximum number of factors in the model. For computational feasibility, we fix the number of factors
in the linear model to 3, which results in 14 models. Each of these 14 models refers to its linear structure. In
this sense, there are infinitely many probability distributions that can be fully specified within a model. For the
system without replication, we analyze all 14 models as true models. The most complex model has 7 predictors
(Fig. 1A), including three main effects, three 2–way interactions, and one 3–way interaction. We fix the sample
size to 100 and calibrate the ratio of the error variance σ2 to expected value of the model at the mean value of
the predictors E(y|µx) where µx = E(x). We fix σ2 : E(y|µx) to (1 : 4) (and include results for (1 : 1), (4 : 1)
in S13 Figure-S22 Figure; S5 Appendix).
Design of ABM experiments. For the system with replication, we use three true models representing
a gradient of complexity (Fig. 1A TM1, TM2, TM3). We set up a completely randomized factorial simulation
experiment: 3 true models, 3 σ2 : E(y|µx) levels at (1 : 4), (1 : 1), (4 : 1), 5 scientist populations (S6 Table), and
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2 model comparison statistics (AIC, SC). We run each experimental condition as an ABM simulation for 11000
iterations and replicated 100 times, each using a different random seed. We discard the first 1000 iterations as
burn-in, except when analyzing the mean first passage time to true model. Code and data are given in S7 Code
and Data.
A brief discussion of our modeling choices, assumptions, and their
implications
Our model-centric framework facilitates investigating the consequences of the process of scientific discovery,
including reproducibility, as a system-wide phenomenon. System-wide reproducibility and its relationship
to scientific discovery are largely unexplored topics. Navigating through numerous potential variables and
parameters to create a realistic system rich in behavior whose outcomes are easily interpretable is challenging.
Our model aims to create such a system by making design choices and simplifying assumptions. Among many
results that we obtain, we report some intuitive results as sanity checks. These results connect our idealized
system to reality. However, we highlight the results that seem counter-intuitive to us because we find them to be
interesting patterns warranting further investigation. The implications and limitations of each specific result are
discussed in the Results section.
Here, we qualitatively clarify the implications and limitations of our system and emphasize the assumptions
which constitute its salient features for our results to hold. We anchor our system firmly against the backdrop of
guarantees provided by statistical theory to avoid over-generalization.
What statistical theory offers in isolation. A well-known statistical inference mode is comparing a set
of hypotheses represented as probabilistic models, with the goal of selecting a model. A statistical method selects
the model which fits the stochastic observations best according to some well-defined measure. Consider the
following three conditions:
1. There exists a true model generating the observations and it is in the search set.
2. The signal in the observations is detectable.
3. A reliable method whose assumptions are met is used to perform inferences.
If these conditions are met, then the statistical theory guarantees that under repeated testing with independent
observations, the true model is selected with highest frequency. This frequency approaches to a constant value
determined by conditions (1),(2), and (3). The practical implication of this guarantee is that the results under
the true model are reproducible with a constant rate.
We now contemplate on the consequences of violating conditions (1)-(3). If condition (1) is not met, then the
true model cannot be selected. In this case, well-established methods select the model that is closest to the true
model and in the set with highest frequency. As we discuss in research strategies below, this is a situation where
if results are reproducible they are not true.
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Conditions (2) and (3) work in conjunction. A method is reliable with respect to the strength of the signal it
is designed to detect. There are a variety of ways to evaluate the reliability of statistical methods. Hypothesis
tests use specificity and sensitivity. Modern model selection methods often invoke an information-theoretic
measure. Intuitively, we expect a statistical test designed to detect the bias in a coin to perform well even with
small sample size if the coin is heavy on heads because the data structure is simple and the signal strong. We
would be fortunate, however, if a model selection method can discern between two complex models close to each
other with the same sample size. If we violate condition (2) or (3), then we have an unreliable method to detect
the strength of the signal. In this case, even if the true model generating the observations is in the set, we might
not be able to select it with high frequency due to the mismatch between the performance of the method and
the strength of the signal (see also [18] for a discussion of how method choice might affect reproducibility).
When conditions (1)-(3) are met, statistical guarantees hold in the absence of external factors that are not
part of the data generating mechanism and the inference process. To quote Lindley [19]: “Statisticians tend
to study problems in isolation, with the result that combinations of statements are not needed, and it is in
the combinations that difficulties can arise [...]” Scientific claims often are accompanied by statistical evidence
to support them. However, we doubt that in practice scientific discovery is always based on evidence using
statistical methods whose assumptions are satisfied. A variety of external factors such as choices made in theory
building, design of experiments, data collection, and analyses might affect system-wide properties in scientific
discovery. Our work is motivated to develop intuition on how some of these external factors affect the guarantees
made by statistical theory. In particular, we introduce external factors which violate conditions (1)-(3), and
produce counter-intuitive results. We explicitly discuss two factors that have major effects on our outcomes next.
Research strategies as an external factor and their potential counter-intuitive effect on repro-
ducibility. When scientists aim to discover a true model among a large number of candidate models, reducing
the search space is critical. Our system introduces one external factor to statistical theory as research strategies
which determine the models to be tested at each step of the scientific process thereby serving as a means to
reduce the search space. However, by choosing models to reduce the search space, the research strategies also
affect the frequency of testing each model. As a consequence of affecting frequencies of tests, these strategies
may alter the results guaranteed by statistical theory in many ways. Results depend on how frequently these
strategies are employed by the scientific community and how frequently they propose each model. In this sense,
the strategies determine the opportunity given to each model to show its value.
To clarify the effect that strategies can have on reproducibility, we give an extreme example. Consider a
search space with only three possible models. We pursue the bizarre research strategy to always test two of
these models against each other, neither of which is the true model generating the data. Then:
1. The true model will never be selected because it is never tested.
2. Between the two models tested, the model that is closer to the true model will be selected with higher
frequency than the model further.
3. The result stated in item (2) is reproducible.
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This toy example shows that we can follow strategies which produce results that are reproducible but not true.
In this work, we further show that counter-intuitive results like this can arise under mild research strategies that
modify the search space in subtle ways. However, our results do not mean that true results are not reproducible.
In fact, this is a sanity check that we have in our system: provided the three conditions of the previous section
are met, true results are reproducible.
System updating as an external factor and its effect on reproducibility. A second external factor
that our system introduces is the temporal characteristic of the scientific discovery. Probabilistic uncertainty
dictates that one instance of statistical inference cannot be conclusive even if the true model is included in the
test set and it produces highly reliable data. Thus, repeated testing through time using independent data sets
calls for a temporal stochastic process. A state variable defines this process whose outcome is determined as a
function of this state variable with respect to a reasonable measure of success.
The natural state variable in our system is the model selected in each test. We think of this model as a
pragmatic consensus of the scientific community at any given time in the process of scientific discovery. When
another model is proposed, it is tested against this consensus.
There are difficulties in defining a reasonable success measure for models, however. A pragmatic consensus of
the scientific community is presumably a model which withstands testing against other models to some degree.
The consensus is expected to survive even if it is not selected, say, a few times. A tally of each model against
every other model can be kept introducing a system memory. This tally, can be used as prior evidence in the next
testing instance of particular models. Introducing memory into the temporal process is technically easy. The
real difficulty is how to choose the success measure. A decision rule about when a model should lose confidence
and be replaced by another model is needed. Consider the following example: Consensus model A and model B
were compared two times each winning once. In the third comparison, model B wins. Should we abandon model
A and make model B consensus? If not, how many more times should model B win against model A before we
are willing to replace model A?
We find these questions challenging, but they help illustrate our point. One of several well-known rules from
decision theory can be implemented to update the consensus. No matter which rule is chosen, however, it will
affect system-wide properties including the reproducibility of results. In this sense, a decision rule is another
external factor: Precisely because the rule dictates when a model becomes consensus, it has the power to alter
the frequency of statistical results in the process, otherwise obtained in isolation.
Even without the complication of a decision rule, scientific strategies make our system complex. They produce
a diverse array of results whose implications we do not fully understand. Hence, we left the complication of
model memory out of our system by choosing to update the consensus with the selected model at each test.
This corresponds to a memoryless 0− 1 decision rule. We admit that this memoryless property of our model is
unsatisfactory and might not reflect a realistic representation of the scientific process. We caution the reader
to interpret our results with care on this aspect. On the other hand, we are interested in system-wide and
aggregate results of our model through time. That is, we look at the rate of reproducibility and other properties
of scientific discovery in a given process by integrating across many independent iterations of tests and systems.
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Thus, our sanity checks still apply. For example, we expect (and find) the scientific consensus to converge to the
true model once it is discovered, and the true model to be sticky and reproducible. While the memorylessness of
our system might prevent the scientific process being realistically captured at any given point in the process, on
the aggregate we are able to observe certain realistic patterns.
Results
First, we present results in a system with no replicator where properties of our scientific process can be obtained
for all true models in our model space using Markov chain theory and computationally efficient Monte Carlo
methods (S8 Appendix). We use this computational advantage to gain insight into process properties and to
inform ABM experiments for the system with replication, in which exploring all model space is computationally
unfeasible. Second, we present results from these ABM experiments (S9 Table).
Results in a system with no replication
We examine stickiness of the true model, time spent at the true model, and mean first passage time to the
true model for populations composed of different proportions of Tess, Mave, and Bo. Our interest is in how
the proportion of different research strategies represented in scientist populations influences these desirable
properties of scientific discovery. A key feature of the theoretical calculations we present in this section is the
implementation of soft research strategies where all scientists are allowed to propose a model not consistent
with their strategy with a small probability. Technically, this feature guarantees that the transition probability
matrix of the Markov chain is well connected. In the system with replicator, we investigate hard research
strategies—where scientists are allowed to propose only models consistent with their strategy—in addition to
soft strategies. We compare results across four scientific populations, two model comparison statistics—Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Criterion (SC), and all possible true models in our model space
(Fig. 1A). We fix a low error variance to model expectation ratio (1 : 4).
Stickiness, the probability of the true model staying as global model once it is hit, is high under low error
both for AIC (Fig. 1B) and SC (Fig. 1C). This result serves as a sanity check for our theoretical model. Once the
true model becomes the consensus, it stays as such most of the time. The stickiness of the true model increases
with complexity, except for the Bo-dominant population. For Bo-dominant population, stickiness decreases with
complexity, except for the most complex true model which Bo cannot overfit.
Even though the true model is sticky under low error, and hence, tends to stay as global model once it is hit,
the system still spends considerable time at models that are not true. For example, Bo-dominant population
overfits unduly complex models, spending only 25% of the time at the true model under AIC and 48% under
SC (S10 Figure, S11 Figure). This population spends most time in models more complex than the true model.
Out of 14 true models in our model space, under AIC 4 are not among Bo-dominant population’s top 3 most
visited models, and under SC 4 are not the most visited model. This is a consequence of Bo’s strategy to
add only interaction predictors to her proposed models, which regularly pits the global model against more
11
complex models. Bo’s poor performance is striking because boundary conditions show whether the relationship
between variables holds across the values of other variables and hence, boundary testing is a widely used strategy
for theory development in many disciplines [22, 23]. In comparison with Bo-dominant population, Tess- and
Mave-dominant populations spend more time in the true model, regardless of its complexity (47% and 41% under
AIC and 67% and 72% under SC, respectively). Overall, the theory testing and maverick strategies maximize
the probability of spending time at the true model under AIC and SC, respectively.
For the epistemically diverse population, the true model is in top 3 most visited models irrespective of its
complexity (S12 Figure). Because boundary testing strategy is ineffective in capturing the true model, the
presence of Bos causes the epistemically diverse population to spend less time at the true model (36% under AIC
and 62% under SC) than Tess- or Mave-dominant populations. However, the effect of overfitting complex models
by Bo is alleviated in this population due to the presence of other research strategies in the population and
does not prevent the epistemically diverse population from consistently recovering the true model. In essence,
epistemic diversity protects against ineffective research strategies.
We assessed the speed of scientific discovery by the mean first passage time to the true model. In this system
without replication, where the transition matrix is well connected due to the implementation of soft research
strategies, the true model is hit quickly across all populations (between 3.39 and 6.43 mean number of steps)
when noise-to-signal ratio is low. Increasing the proportion of boundary testers in the population, however,
slows down the discovery of the true model. Further, the model comparison statistic interacts with scientist
populations with respect to the speed of discovery. Under AIC, Tess-dominant population is the fastest to find
the true model (Fig. 3A, Tess). In comparison, as shown by red region in Fig. 3A, Bo-dominant population is
slow to discover the true model. Tess’ s speeding up the discovery of truth is also reflected in the epistemically
diverse population. Using SC as opposed to AIC as the model comparison statistic decreases differences across
populations (Fig. 3B), increasing the speed of discovery for all populations. The fastest population to hit the
true model is the epistemically diverse population under SC. We find that the speed of discovery slows down
considerably as the noise-to-signal ratio is increased to (4 : 1) (S22 Figure).
These results from the system with no replication show that while the true model is sticky and reached
quickly under low error in a well connected system, the scientific population still spends considerable time in
false models over the long run. Moreover, proportion of research strategies in scientific populations, true model
complexity, and model comparison statistic have an effect on all of these properties. Overall, Bo-dominant
population performs poorly in most scenarios whereas Tess- and Mave-dominant populations excel in different
scenarios. Epistemically diverse population minimizes the risk of worst outcomes. These patterns that we
described change substantially as the ratio of error variance to model expectation in the system increases (S13
Figure-S22 Figure). We now discuss the implications and limitations of results presented so far for the scientific
practice.
Implications and limitations. When the truth exists and is accessible, we find that scientific process
indeed discovers and sticks to it in most situations. The exceptions to this result come from 1) research strategies
that search the model space in a biased manner and fail to test the true model against alternatives often enough,
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Fig 3. The mean first passage time from each initial model (vertical axis) to each true model (horizontal axis)
using AIC (A) and SC (B) as model comparison statistics per scientist populations. All stands for epistemically
diverse; other populations are dominant in the given type.
and 2) large error in the data generating process. In practice, (1) might be realized when there is no overarching
theoretical framework guiding the search of model space but instead folk theories or intuitions are used to reduce
the possibilities [27]. Further, (2) is a real challenge, especially in disciplines where data do not carry a strong
signal (e.g., low estimated effect sizes in psychology literature) or whose methods are not sufficiently fine-tuned
to detect the signal (e.g., high measurement error). While these are implications that might hold qualitatively
for real-life scientific practice, we caution the readers to not over-generalize specific parameters such as the
stickiness of a true model and the proportion of time spent at the true model. These quantities depend on the
parameters of our system, such as the number of models in the universe, and the linear models framework.
Results in a system with replication
In addition to the properties analyzed in the previous section, in the system with replication we can also analyze
the rate of reproducibility since we introduce a replicator in the system. One of our goals is to understand
the relationship between reproducibility and other desirable properties of scientific discovery. Informed by the
findings reported in the previous section, we run the ABM under three true models of varying complexity, three
levels of error variance to model expectation ratio, five scientific populations, and two model comparison statistics
(S9 Table). Moreover, ABM allows us to implement hard research strategies where scientists propose only models
complying with their strategies and all models incompatible with a given research strategy have zero probability
of being proposed by the scientists pursuing that strategy (S5 Appendix). Thus, connectedness among models is
restricted in this framework for all scientists with the exception of Mave whose research strategy allows her to
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propose any model at any given time, and who thereby maintains a soft research strategy. When the transition
matrix is highly connected, the discovery of truth is fast, as shown in the previous section. In the current section,
we explore how the speed of discovery changes under restricted connectedness for different scientist populations.
Reproducible results do not imply convergence to scientific truth
We first explored the relationship between the rate of reproducibility and other desirable properties of scientific
discovery, and found that this relationship must be interpreted with caution. In our framework, we defined the
rate of reproducibility as the probability of the global model staying the same after a replication experiment.
We show that the rate of reproducibility has no causal effect on other desirable properties of scientific discovery
including: the probability that a model is selected as the global model in the long run, the mean first time to
hit a model, and stickiness of a model (see S23 Appendix for mathematical proof). Thus, although multiple
confirmations of a result in a scientific inquiry lend credibility to that result, withstanding the test of multiple
confirmations is not sufficient for convergence to scientific truth.
On the other hand, desirable properties of scientific discovery and the rate of reproducibility might be
correlated. Whether there is any correlation depends on the research strategies and their frequency in the
population (see S23 Appendix for mathematical explanation). We present scatter plots (Fig. 4A and Fig. 4B)
as evidence for the complexity of these correlations across scientist populations. From these scatter plots
and Fig. 4C, we see, for example, that Bo-dominant populations reach perfect rate of reproducibility while
spending little time at the true model (as assessed by the very low Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient,
rSR = −0.06), which confirms that high rate of reproducibility does not imply true results.
Across all simulations, as the rate of reproducibility increases, scientist populations do not necessarily spend
more time on the true model, as indicated by a lack of correlation between rate of reproducibility and time spent
at the true model (rSR = −0.02, Fig. 4A). Further, as the rate of reproducibility increases, the discovery of
truth slows down rather than speeding up as shown by a positive but small correlation (rSR = 0.26, Fig. 4B).
Crucially, both of these correlations are driven by the research strategy dominant in the population and should
only be taken as evidence for the complexity of these relationships between rate of reproducibility and other
desirable properties of scientific discovery (see Table 3 in S24 Appendix for all correlation coefficients per scientist
population). For example, Bo-dominant population reaches almost perfect reproducibility (Fig. 4A-C, red) while
taking a long time to hit the true model and spending short time at it. On the other hand, Mave-dominant
population hits the true model quickly and spends long time there (Fig. 4A-C, blue), but it has a much lower
rate of reproducibility than Bo-dominant population.
Implications and limitations. This counter-intuitive result on reproducibility is due to violating assump-
tions of statistical methods. Statistical theory guarantees to find the true data generating mechanism as the
best fit for the observed data, if a reliable method operates in the absence of external factors. The research
strategies implemented in our ABM include critical external factors that determine how the model space is
searched. For Bo-dominant populations, we get high levels of reproducibility and low level of actual discovery
for the same reason: Models proposed by Bos consistently result in fitting overly-complex models to data but
14
A B
C
Mean First Passage 
Time to True Model
Proportion of Time
 True Model is Global Model
Fig 4. For Rey-, Tess-, Mave-, Bo-dominant, and epistemically diverse populations: (A) The rate of
reproducibility against time spent at true model. (B) The rate of reproducibility against mean first passage time
to true model. (C) Summary statistics with highest IQRs indicated by ∗. Mean first passage time to true model
in number of time steps; all else in percent points. Violin plots for the mean first passage time to the true model
per population type versus (D) complexity of true model and (E) error variance to model expectation ratio.
Dots mark the means.
lead to reproducible inferences since the comparisons are often between models that are 1) not true and 2) far
from each other in the sense of statistical distance. As a result, even though the true model is not proposed, and
hence not selected as the global model, the method consistently favors the same untrue model when a specific
comparison is repeated with independent data.
Mave-dominant populations search the full model space and consequently discover the true model quickly.
Their rate of reproducibility is lower relative to Bo-dominant populations. This is because randomly proposed
models are typically not true, but also, Maves do not have a biased strategy of proposing models that are far
away from the global model. Hence, Mave’s comparisons do not always favor a specific model especially when
models close to each other are tested.
The effects discussed in this section are marginal main effects of scientist populations over other factors that
we vary in our ABM, including levels of noise-to-signal ratio. Due to this marginalization, the mean noise-to-signal
ratio that affects the results is higher in our ABM than the system without replication. Nonetheless, our sanity
checks still capture the salient properties of scientific discovery well. For example, the basic expectation that
a successful scientific endeavor will move us closer to truth is captured. Fig. 4C confirms that most scientific
populations (with the exception of Bo-dominant) spend considerable time at the true model. In all populations,
the true model is sticky. The rate of reproducibility under the true model is higher than the overall rate of
reproducibility across all models that become the global model. The scientific community ultimately discovers
the true model with varying speed, depending on dominant strategies represented in the population. We also
find that the rate of reproducibility is highly positively correlated with stickiness of the true model in most
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scientist populations except Bo-dominant (Table 3 in S24 Appendix). The rate of reproducibility is also positively
correlated with time spent at true model for most populations, although these correlations are expectedly lower
because they are unconditional on the first time to discovery. Speed of discovery has low correlation with the
rate of reproducibility. This makes intuitive sense because speed of discovery is largely determined by how the
model space is searched (i.e., an external factor) whereas the rate of reproducibility is collectively determined by
all variables in the system.
Against this backdrop, we speculate how these counter-intuitive findings might extend to the practice of
science beyond our theoretical framework. What we observe appears akin to the tension noted by Shiffrin,
Bo¨rner, and Stigler [25] regarding the risk of obstructing scientific exploration by imposing restrictions on
how science should be conducted. Indeed, we show that exploratory strategies (represented by Maves in our
system) are needed to speed up scientific discovery. But then we also need scientists testing theory and running
replication studies (e.g, Tess and Reys) to establish which discoveries are true. If we restrict exploration to allow
only research strategies that search the model space in an extremely biased manner (e.g, Bos), we may lock
ourselves in a vicious circle of never making a discovery. The reason is that we may be able to obtain high rate of
reproducibility as an artifact of this research strategy. Our cases may be extreme and in reality we might expect
diverse scientist populations to emerge naturally. However, past research suggests that if incentive structures
reward Bo-like strategies due to high rates of reproducibility they report, these strategies may be widely selected
for in scientific populations [7] thereby resulting in canonization of false results [9].
Innovation speeds up scientific discovery
Mave-dominant population is the fastest to hit the true model (Fig. 4C S25 Figure A) regardless of the true model
complexity and the error variance to model expectation ratio (Fig. 4D and Fig. 4E). Further, for epistemically
diverse population in which all scientist types are equally represented, the proportion of mavericks is sufficient
to garner this desirable result. The reason is that Mave provides connectedness in transitioning from model
to model via her soft research strategy even when all other scientists represented in the scientific population
pursue hard research strategies. All other homogeneous populations take a long time to reach the truth due to
pursuing hard research strategies. For example, the estimate for mean first passage time to the true model for
Bo-dominant population is 1592.5 steps (Fig. 4C). We also ran the ABM with soft research strategies and include
the results regarding speed of discovery in Table 4 (S26 Appendix) as further confirmation that connectedness
among models leads to faster discovery in Tess- and Bo-dominant populations, besides Mave-dominant and
epistemically diverse populations.
Implications and limitations. The idea that innovative research plays a significant role in scientific
discovery is intuitive and hardly new [14–16]. Our results qualify this idea in a particular way: Innovation leads
to fast discovery, which is a property determined by the stochastic process governing the connectedness of models.
We should note that the memorylessness property of our system might have exaggerated the role of Maves in
making a quick discovery. If all scientists carry a tally of past results and adjust their strategies accordingly, it is
possible that the model space could be explored more efficiently by scientist types other than Mave. What is
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needed in essence is not Maves necessarily but a way to guarantee high connectedness among models in the
search space and an efficient search algorithm. Arguably the role of innovative, exploratory research is more
critical early on in the research cycle and once we are in the vicinity of truth, limited scientific resources might
be better spent elsewhere (e.g., confirmatory research or pursuit of other research questions).
Epistemic diversity optimizes the process of scientific discovery
We looked at which scientific population optimizes across all desirable properties of scientific discovery. Figure 4C
summarizes the sample median and interquartile range for the time spent at, the stickiness of, and the mean
first passage time to the true model, as well as the rate of reproducibility (also see S25 Figure). These statistics
show the advantage of an epistemically diverse population of scientists on the efficiency of scientific discovery.
Homogeneous populations with one dominant research strategy tend to perform poorly in at least one of
these desirable properties. For example, Rey-dominant population has low median rate of reproducibility.
Mave-dominant population has low median rate of reproducibility and high variability in time spent at the
true model. Tess-dominant population has high variability in mean first passage time to the true model and
the rate of reproducibility. Bo-dominant population has low median time spent at the true model, low median
stickiness, and high variability in mean first passage time to the true model. In contrast to all these examples,
epistemically diverse population always performs better than the worst homogeneous population with respect to
all properties and further, it has low variability. Thus, epistemic diversity serves as a buffer against weaknesses
of each research strategy, consistent with results from the system with no replication. We conclude that among
the scientist populations we investigate, epistemic diversity optimizes the properties of scientific discovery that
we specified as desirable.
Implications and limitations. We believe that the importance of epistemic diversity is intuitive, yet, it
cannot be emphasized enough. Our definition of epistemic diversity is limited to the representation of the four
research strategies that we included in our system. In reality, there are numerous philosophical (e.g., logical
positivist, post-modernist), research methodological (e.g., empirical experimentation, computer simulations,
ethnography), and statistical (e.g., frequentist, likelihoodist, Bayesian) approaches to conducting science and
our model is agnostic as to what kind or what degree of epistemic diversity would optimize scientific discovery.
We merely find that the role of epistemic diversity in scientific population is akin to diversifying an investment
portfolio to reduce risk while trying to optimize returns.
Methodological choices affect time spent at scientific truth
The choice of method may appear to be perfunctory if multiple methods perform well. However, violating the
assumptions of a method affects the results of an analysis performed with that method. The effects of the model
comparison statistic in our system, where a comparison of misspecified models is routinely performed, is not
trivial [24]. When true model complexity is low, using SC for model comparison increases the time spent at the
true model compared to AIC (S27 FigureA). As model complexity increases, however, this difference disappears
and further, AIC has lower variability. When the ratio of error variance to model expectation is low, SC leads
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to a longer time spent at the true model. As the ratio of error variance to model expectation increases, AIC
and SC spend comparable amount of time at the true model, but AIC has smaller variability (S27 FigureB).
Averaged over all other parameters, SC spends longer time at the true model than AIC (medians = 27.05% and
19.83%, respectively), but with greater variability (IQR = 66.03% and 33.80%, respectively).
Implications and limitations. The finding that methodological tools might affect scientific progress is
factually known [28,29] and being studied extensively by statisticians and meta-scientists alike. Model comparison
methods such as AIC and SC as well as all other statistical inference methods work best when their assumptions
are met and might lead to invalid inferences under assumption violations. An unsurprising implication of our
findings is that statistical theory should inform statistical practice even in the absence of well-known procedural
violations such as p-hacking.
Conclusion
We studied the process of scientific discovery and reproducibility in a meta-scientific framework using a model-
centric approach. We have chosen a model-centric approach because 1) it translates to scientific models directly,
2) it is a generic mode of inference encompassing hypothesis testing, and 3) model selection methods bypass
difficulties associated with classical hypothesis testing.
Our scientists engage in straightforward research strategies and do not commit experimenter bias, learn
from their own or others’ experiences, engage in hypothesis testing, or commit measurement errors. Further,
they are not prone to QRPs or structural incentives. We also assume that there exists a true model that our
scientist population attempts to discover and that this true model is within the search space readily available to
the scientist population. These factors that we have abstracted away are potential avenues for future research,
particularly for complex social dynamics, but our goal here was to explore how the process of scientific discovery
works in an idealized framework. We did, however, provide sanity checks to make sure that our system behaves
in meaningful ways with respect to what we would expect from a well-functioning scientific process.
Our study shows that even in this idealized framework, the link between reproducibility and the convergence
to a scientific truth is not straightforward. A dominant research strategy producing highly reproducible results
might select untrue models and steer the scientific community away from the truth. Reproducible false results
may also arise due to bias in methods and instruments used, as discussed by Baumgaertner and colleagues [18].
While both reproducibility and convergence to a scientific truth are presumably desirable properties of scientific
discovery, they are not equivalent concepts. In our system inequivalence of these concepts is explained by a
combination of research strategies, statistical methods, noise-to-signal ratio, and the complexity of truth. This
finding further indicates that issues regarding reproducibility or validity of scientific results should not be reduced
down to QRPs or structural incentives. Considering such methodological and institutional factors, however,
would add additional layers of complication, moving us even further away from the guarantees provided by
statistical theory.
Not all our results are as counter-intuitive however. On a positive note, we find that the process of scientific
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discovery is rendered efficient if the transitions between models in the model space are easy. Scientist populations
that expedite transitions via promoting innovative research or pursuing flexible strategies will discover the truth
quickly. In real life, we surmise that the model space might be much larger and the true model–if it exists–might
not necessarily be easily accessible in the search space. Therefore, an outstanding challenge for science appears
to be to attain a scientific population that can realize optimum connectedness in the model space to expedite
the discovery of truth.
Recently, Shiffrin, Bo¨rner, and Stigler [25] have warned against “one size fits all” type of approaches in science
and scientific reforms, advising a nuanced approach instead (p.2638). Complementary to their perspective,
our results also advise against homogeneity in scientific practice. We find that a diversity of strategies in the
scientific population optimizes across desirable properties of scientific discovery—a finding consistent with the
cognitive division of labor literature [26]. If populations are largely homogeneous, with one research strategy
dominant over others, then the scientific population tends to perform poorly on at least one of the desirable
properties which might mean forsaking reproducibility or delaying discovery.
We find that the choice of statistics relative to true model complexity has non-trivial effects on our results.
This is corroborated by recent statistical theory [24]. The difficulty is that the complexity of the true model is
often unknown to scientists who make not only their statistical inference but also their methodological choices
under uncertainty. We believe that model complexity may have differential effects on the desirable properties of
scientific discovery depending on the choice of statistic.
Our model, as any other model, is an abstraction of reality and we believe that we have captured salient
features of the scientific process of interest to our research questions. Main limitations of our framework
are the lack of capacity to learn and memorylessness of scientists. The replicator only provides meta-level
information about the scientific process and does not contribute directly to the accumulation of scientific
knowledge. Incorporating past reproducibility of specific results in decision making strategies might allow the
replicator to make substantial contributions to scientific discovery. A realistic implementation of this aspect
requires our virtual scientists to adopt machine learning algorithms that can heuristically teach them to become
intelligent agents.
Our research also raises questions with regard to reproducibility of scientific results. If reproducibility can be
uncorrelated with other possibly desirable properties of scientific discovery, optimizing the scientific process for
reproducibility might present trade-offs against other desirable properties. How should scientists resolve such
trade-offs? What outcomes should scientists aim for to facilitate an efficient and proficient scientific process?
We leave such considerations for future work.
Supporting information
S1 Appendix. A stochastic process of scientific discovery. Consider an infinite population of scientists
conducting a sequence of idealized experiments ξ(t) := (M
(t)
P , θ,D
(t), S,K(t)), indexed by time t = 1, 2, · · ·
where M
(t)
P belongs to a set of probability structures M = {M1,M2, · · · ,ML} known to all scientists. Further,
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assume that there are A distinct scientist types in the population, each with a well-defined research strategy
R ∈ R = {Ro, R1, · · · , RA} of proposing a model in their experiment. These strategies depend on the type
of scientist and a global model M
(t)
G ∈M,K(t), which represents the consensus of the scientist population at
time t. The population of scientists aims to find the true model MT ∈M. A scientist selected to conduct an
experiment at time t, uses her background knowledge K(t) to propose a new candidate model M
(t)
P . Specifically,
we define K(t) as a probability distribution P(MP |R(t),M (t)G ), where {MP ,M (t)G } ∈ M2, and R(t) ∈ R.
The initial conditions of our stochastic process include the true model MT , true parameter values θT of MT ,
an initial global model M
(0)
G , a method for model selection S, and the sample size of the data n. At each time
step, an idealized experiment ξ(t) is performed and new data D(t) of size n is generated independent of everything
else from distribution MT (θT ). Each experiment is performed by a scientist randomly selected from A types
in the population using the categorical distribution with probabilities (p1, p2, · · · , pA). The selected scientist
proposes a model M
(t)
P with probability P(MP |R(t),M (t)G ) conditional on a research strategy fully specified by
her type and the current global model. Given the data D(t), model scores under the proposed model and the
current global model are calculated as S(M
(t)
P ) and S(M
(t)
G ), respectively. The model with favorable score (i.e.,
smaller for both AIC and SC) is set as the new global model M
(t+1)
G . This mechanism represents how scientific
consensus is updated in light of new evidence.
A defining property of our stochastic process with no replication is that K(t) depends only on quantities at
time t. If Ra ∈ R depends only on M (t)G for all a, the transition from M (t)G to M (t+1)G admits the Markov property
and the stochastic process representing the scientific process is a Markov chain with transition probabilities
given by
P(M (t+1)G = M`|M (t)G = Mi) =
A∑
a=1
P(S(M`) < S(Mi))P(M`|Ra,Mi)P(Ra). (1)
On the right hand side of Eq. (1), the last term is the probability of selecting a scientist with research strategy
Ra independent of all else, the middle term is the probability of proposing the model M` given the current
global model Mi and the scientist type a with research strategy Ra selected. The probability P(S(M`) < S(Mi))
depends on MT via D
(t) generated and it is obtained by
∫
Θ
∫
D P(S(M`) < S(Mi)|D)P(D|θ)P(θ)dDdθ, where
P(θ) is the probability of parameter, P(D|θ) is the likelihood of the data, and P(S(M`) < S(Mi)|D) is the
probability that the proposed model M` has a more favorable score than Mi conditional on data. By convention
we set P(S(M`) < S(M)i) = 1 when ` = i, and P(M`|Ra,Mi) > 0 for all a, i, ` so that transition probabilities are
nonzero for all models and scientist types. This second condition guarantees that our Markov chain is ergodic,
which implies that it has a unique stationary distribution—its limiting distribution for visiting a model.
When there are no replication experiments in the system, K(t) is defined as P(MP |R(t),M (t)G ) which states
that conditional on R(t) and M
(t)
G , the probability of proposing a model is independent of the past time steps.
Let Ro ∈ R be the replicator strategy. Given the proposed and global models at time t − 1, the replicator
strategy at time t, R
(t)
o , is to perform an experiment at time t, using the exact same proposed and global models
as those at time t − 1, but with new data D(t) generated under MT (θT ). Since Ro ∈ R depends on M (t−1)G ,
the transition from M
(t)
G to M
(t+1)
G does not admit the Markov property anymore and the stochastic process
20
representing the scientific process is a higher order Markov chain. The transition probabilities of the Markov
chain at time t can be expressed by conditioning on whether a scientist chosen at a given time is a replicator:
P(R(t) 6= Ro)P(M (t+1)G |M (t)G ) +
P(R(t) = Ro)[P(R(t−1) 6= Ro)P(M (t+1)G |M (t)G ,M (t−1)G ) + · · ·+
P(R(1) = Ro)[P(R(0) 6= Ro)P(M (t+1)G |M (t)G ,M (t−1)G , · · · ,M (0)G )] · · · ]. (2)
In Eq. (2), the first term in the sum is the joint probability of choosing a scientist who is not a replicator at time
t and the transition probability from global model at time t to global model at time t+ 1. Since the scientists
are chosen independently of all else, the joint probability is written as the product of choosing a scientist who is
not a replicator at time t, given by P(R(t) 6= Ro), and the probability of transition to the global model at time
t+ 1 is given by Eq. (1). The second term in the sum is the joint probability of choosing a scientist who is a
replicator at time t and the transition probabilities to a model. We write the second term as the product of
P(R(t) = Ro) and the transition probabilities when a replicator is chosen. If the scientist at time t is a replicator,
she replicates the experiment at time step t− 1, which might be a replication experiment itself. Therefore, the
transition probabilities to a model within the first brackets is a sum of two probabilities. The first term is the
joint probability of choosing a scientist who is not a replicator and the transition probability in that case, and
the second term is the probability of choosing a replicator given by P(R(t−1) = Ro) at time step t− 1, and the
transition probability in that case. This is a recursive equation, in the sense that the transition probabilities at
time t depend on the transition probabilities at time t− 1. An implication is that the transition probabilities at
time t are path dependent. Therefore, when a replicator scientist is included in the population, we have a higher
order Markov chain, whose long term dynamics are feasible to obtain with a forward simulation method.
For the process with replicator, we lift the assumption P(M`|Ra,Mi) > 0 for all a, i, ` that we imposed
in the process without a replicator. This assumption increases the connectivity of the transition probability
matrix, which makes calculations in the long-term behavior of the Markov chain straightforward. Due to our
new process not admitting the Markov property, these calculations are irrelevant in the analysis of the process
with a replicator. Therefore, we drop the assumption of transitioning from a model to any other model to be
nonzero. Removing this assumption allows us to define scientist types that visit only the subset of all models
consistent with a specific research strategy. This property of the process renders the effects of each research
strategy on the process outcomes well-pronounced.
S2 Appendix. Description of example system of linear models. We define M, the family of linear
models as
{y = Xβ + |βi···jv 6= 0⇒ (βi 6= 0, · · · , βv 6= 0, · · · , βi···j 6= 0)}.
Here, y is n× 1 vector of response variables, X is n× p matrix of predictor variables, β is p× 1 vector of model
parameters, and  is n×1 vector of random errors satisfying the Gauss-Markov conditions E(i) = 0,Var(i) = σ2,
21
and Cov(i, j) = 0 for all i, j. M contains L linear models with up to k factors subject to the constraint
βi···jv 6= 0⇒ (βi 6= 0, · · · , βi···j 6= 0) which guarantees that if a model contains a v–way (v ≤ k) interaction term
of v factors in the model, then all (v − 1)–way, (v − 2)–way, · · · , 2–way interactions of those factors and their
main effects are included in the model. We include the predictor x1 and the response variable y in all models
reflecting our assumption that all scientists in the community focus on a research question that involves at least
one common factor of interest and a common response variable. Let Mi ∈M be a model with pi parameters of
which v`i is the highest order interaction term with order `i denoting the order, #v`i is the cardinality of v`i .
Let Mi Mj denote that Mi is more complex than Mj . We define the model complexity as a partial ordering
obeying three conditions:
1. If pi > pj then Mi Mj .
2. If pi = pj and `i > `j , then Mi Mj .
3. If pi = pj , `i = `j , and #v`i > #v`j , then Mi Mj .
Otherwise, we say that complexities of Mi and Mj are indistinguishable.
S3 Algorithm. Agent-based model algorithm. We first present the general algorithm in the agent-based
model and then discuss specific values used in the article.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for stochastic process of scientific discovery with replicator.
1: Input: M,Θ, S,R,P(Ra),P(M |Ra,M (t)G ),M (0)G ,MT , θT , n, tmax
2: Set t = 0
3: while t < tmax do
4: Simulate Ra ∼ Categorical(p1, p2, · · · , pA)
5: Simulate M
(t)
P ∼ P(M |Ra,M (t)G )
6: Simulate D
(t)
i ∼MT (θT ), for i = 1, 2, · · · , n independently of each other
7: Calculate
S(M
(t)
P )− S(M (t)G ) = C +
n∑
i=1
logP(D(t)i |θˆ,M (t)P )−
n∑
i=1
logP(D(t)i |θˆ,M (t)G ),
where, C = 2p log(n) if SC, or C = 2p if AIC, and θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of θ
8: if S(M
(t)
P ) < S(M
(t)
G ), then
9: Set M
(t+1)
G = M
(t)
P ,
10: else
11: Set M
(t+1)
G = M
(t)
G
12: end if
13: Set t = t+ 1
14: end while
We choose M
(0)
G randomly with equal probability from models in M. Θ determines θmin, θmax and θT is
chosen uniformly randomly on this interval. The parameters of the categorical distribution used in step 4 is
determined by the proportion of scientists in the population.
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S4 Appendix. Properties of scientific discovery.
How quickly does scientific community discover the true model? When there are no replicators in
the model, P = {P(M`|Mi)} is the transition probability matrix given by Eq. (1). We assess the speed with
which scientific community discovers the true model by the mean first passage (or hit) time to the true model.
This is the first time to reach MT , given that we start the system from Mi. The mean first passage time to the
true model which we denote by τi,T , is the expected value of this first passage time to select the true model as
the global model for the first time in the process, given that the process starts from a known model Mi. By
theory of Markov chains we have
τi,T = 1 +
L∑
`=1
M` 6=MT
P(M`|Mi)τ`,T , i = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Given the transition probabilities P(M`|Mi), the solution to this system of L linear equations is readily obtained
by a method to solve linear equations.
When there are replicators in the model, we assess the speed to discover the true model by the mean number
of steps for the system to update the global model to the true model for the first time. The first the time true
model is global model is the mean first passage time to the true model described in the process of scientific
discovery with no replication, but it is unconditional on the starting model.
How “sticky” is the true model as global model? We define stickiness of a model as the mean—over
proposed models—probability of staying in model Mi conditional on the current global model Mi. When there
are no replicators in the model, by theory of Markov chains, it is given by
P(M (t+1)G = Mi|M (t)G = Mi) =
A∑
a=1
L∑
`=1
P(S(Mi) < S(M`))P(M`|Ra,Mi)P(Ra), (3)
where P(Ra) and P(M`|Ra,Mi) are same as in Eq. (1), and P(S(Mi) < S(M`)) is the probability that the current
global model Mi has a more favorable score than the proposed model M`. The right hand side of Eq. (3) can be
calculated for all L models given MT . This probability captures the tendency of scientific community to stay at
a visited model. Calculated for M
(t+1)
G = M
(t)
G = MT , it gives the stickiness of the true model.
When there are replicators in the model, we measure the tendency of the scientific community to maintain
consensus on the true model by the proportion of time that true model remains as global model given that it
was already the global model. Stickiness is the complement of the probability that a global model switches from
true model to another model.
How long does scientific community stay on the true model? By theory of ergodic Markov chains,
the probability that each model is selected as the global model converges to a constant value independent of the
current global model M
(t)
G . The limiting probabilities of a model being selected as a global model reflect the
long-term behavior of the scientific community and the proportion of time spent on each model. These limiting
probabilities are given by limt→∞Pt.
When there are replicators in the model, we assess the mean time the scientific community spends on a
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model (and in particular the true model) as a consensus by the proportion of times that a model is selected
as the global model. We use the proportion of times true model is selected as global model as a proxy for the
limiting probabilities of selecting the true model as the global model in the process of scientific discovery with
no replication.
How reproducible are the results of experiments? Under ABM, we define the rate of reproducibility
as the expectation of Bernoulli distributed random variable I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o }
, which is the indicator function
that takes the value 1 if the global model at time t + 1 is the same as the global model at t given that a
replication experiment is performed at time t. The parameter of the Bernoulli distribution is the probability of
reproducibility P(M (t+1)G = M
(t)
G |R(t)o ). Further, we define the rate of reproducibility when the true model is
the global model by I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o ,M(t)G =MT }
which also determines the rate of reproducibility when the true
model is not the global model I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o ,M(t)G 6=MT }
. We estimate these rates of reproducibility by Monte
Carlo integration of ABM simulations.
Monte Carlo estimates of rates of reproducibility
The random variable I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o }
which takes the value 1 if the global model at time t + 1 is equal to
global model at time t given that at time t we have chosen a replicator, is a Bernoulli distributed random
variable. Its mean is given by E(I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o }) whose Monte Carlo estimate is given by
Ê(I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)o }) =
1
V
V∑
v=1
I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)ov }
,
where R
(t)
ov is the vth instance a replicator is chosen. The rate of reproducibility when the true model is global
model is estimated by
Ê(I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)0 ,M(t)G =MT }) =
1
VT
VT∑
v=1
I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)0v ,M
(t)
G =MT }
which also implies
Ê(I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)0 ,M(t)G 6=MT }) =
1
VN
VN∑
v=1
I{M(t+1)G =M(t)G |R(t)0v ,M
(t)
G 6=MT }
.
Here, VT is the number of times a replicator is selected when the true model is global model and VN is the
number of times a replicator is selected when the true model is not global model, and VT + VN = V .
S5 Appendix. Predictor variables, error variance, and sample size. We uniformly randomly generate
the value of the jth factor at the ith level xij on the set {1, 2, · · · , 100} for all i and j. We fix the sample size
n = 100 and calibrate the ratio of the error variance σ2 to expected value of the model at the mean value of the
predictors E(y|µx), where µx = E(x). We use a standardized linear regression model so that if the ith observed
response is y∗i , then we set yi = (y
∗
i − y¯∗)/s∗, where y¯∗ is the sample mean and s∗ is the sample standard
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deviation of y∗i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Implementing standardized linear regression model allows us to precisely specify
σ2 : E(y|µx). We fix three levels for σ2 : E(y|µx). (1 : 4), (1 : 1), and (4 : 1). We set the true regression
coefficients to be Dirichlet distributed with unit parameters or equivalently, uniformly distributed on the interval
(0, 1) with the constraint that they sum to 1. Thus, all regression coefficients have the same mean effect size.
We set the correlation between the first factor x1 and other factors to a small value of 0.2 to avoid orthogonality
between predictors which is an idealized case that we believe rarely achievable in practice. We performed
additional analyses with higher correlation between predictor variables and found that correlation between
predictors does not affect the results in our system unless it is extremely high and causes multicollinearity.
Model selection criteria. SC is defined by p log(n) − logP(D|θˆ,M), where p is the number of model
parameters, n is the sample size, and θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of model parameters under M .
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is defined by 2p− logP(D|θˆ,M). For both SC and AIC, a smaller value
indicates a better model performance than a larger value. The maximized likelihood logP(D|θˆ,M) rewards
model fit equally in SC and AIC. The first term in these formulas penalize the model complexity, with SC
penalizing complex models more heavily for n ≥ 8 (with log(n)) than AIC as the sample size increases. SC has
the desirable property that when the true model generating the data is in the universe of candidate models, it
selects the true model with probability 1 as n→∞, in other words it is consistent. For model M fitted to D,
we calculate the model selection criteria SC and AIC in a computationally efficient way.
Description of scientists and scientist populations. We let R = {RRey, RTess, RMave, RBo} and define
the transition probabilities for these strategies as follows. For RRey,
P(M (t)P = Mj |M (t−1)P = Mi,M (t)G = M (t−1)G ) =

1 if i = j,
0 otherwise.
For RTess,
P(M (t)P = Mi|M (t)G ) =

1/(m+ 1) if Mi is one of m models
one term away from M
(t)
G ,
mo otherwise.
If RRey ∈ R then mo = 0 and mo = 1/[(L−m)(m+ 1)] otherwise. For RMave, P(M (t)P = Mi|M (t)G ) = 1/L, i =
1, 2, · · · , L. For RBo,
P(M (t)P = Mi|M (t)G ) =

1/(m+ 1) if Mi is one of m models one
interaction larger than M
(t)
G ,
mo otherwise.
If RRey ∈ R then mo = 0 and mo = 1/[(L−m)(m+ 1)] otherwise.
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S6 Table. Populations of scientists with varying proportions of scientist types.
Scenario Population Rey Mave Tess Bo
Without Replicator
Tess Dominant 0 0.005 0.99 0.005
Mave Dominant 0 0.99 0.005 0.005
Bo Dominant 0 0.005 0.005 0.99
All Equal 0 0.3¯ 0.3¯ 0.3¯
With Replicator
Rey Dominant 0.99 0.003¯ 0.003¯ 0.003¯
Tess Dominant 0.003¯ 0.003¯ 0.99 0.003¯
Mave Dominant 0.003¯ 0.99 0.003¯ 0.003¯
Bo Dominant 0.003¯ 0.003¯ 0.003¯ 0.99
All Equal 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
S7 Code and Data. The code to perform the simulations and analyze the data generated in this project,
and a summary data set are included as a Git repository at https://github.com/gnardin/CRUST. Refer to
the description in the main page of this repository for further instructions and details of the implementation.
S8 Appendix. Monte Carlo Estimates of Model Comparisons. Let y denote n× 1 vector of responses
generated by the true model and X be n× p matrix of predictors, where p is the number of parameters in the
fitted model. Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions E(i) = 0, V ar(i) = σ2, Cov(i, j) for all i, j we denote
the vector of joint maximum likelihood estimates for the regression coefficients by βˆ. By definition of Schwarz
Criterion
S(M) = 2p log(n)− 2 logP(y|X, βˆ).
If Akaike’s Information Criterion is used, 2p replaces 2p log(n). The loglikelihood in the second term is equal to
n times the log of the residual sums of squares and it can be written as
logP(y|X, βˆ) = n log(y′y − y′X(X′X)−1X′y) + C,
where C is a term dependent only on MT . For transition probabilities, we are interested in P(S(Mi) < S(Mj)).
We have
S(Mi)− S(Mj) = (pi − pj) log(n) + n log(y′Xi(X′iXi)−1X′iy)
−n log(y′Xj(X′jXj)−1X′jy), (4)
where subscripts i, j now denote quantities that depend on modelMi andMj . The random variable I{S(Mi)−S(Mj)<0|MT }
is Bernoulli distributed with probability of success P(S(Mi) − S(Mj) < 0) which is equal to its expectation
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E(I{S(Mi)−S(Mj)<0|MT }) whose Monte Carlo estimate is given by
Ê(I{S(Mi)−S(Mj)<0|MT }) =
1
V
V∑
v=1
I{S(Mi)−S(Mj)<0|yv}. (5)
An estimate of P(S(Mi)−S(Mj) < 0) is obtained using Eq. (5) conditional on true model MT and its predictors
XT as follows. First, generate the set of k predictor variables and build Xi and Xj for Mi and Mj respectively.
Then generate βTv , v = 1, 2, · · · , V independently of each other. Finally, simulate yv|XT ,βTv from the normal
distribution with expected value E(yv) = XTβTv and variance σ2. Each realization (y1,y2, · · · ,yv) is used in
Eq. (4) to assess S(Mi)− S(Mj) < 0 and the estimate is obtained using the mean in Eq. (5).
S9 Table. Parameter values we used for the completely randomized factorial design experiment
to generate the results reported in this work.
Parameter Value
replications 100
timesteps 11000
k 3
sigma 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8
sampleSize 100
trueModel x1 + x2,
x1 + x2 + x3 + x1x2, and
x1 + x2 + x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3
correlation 0.2
nRey 1 and 300
nTess 1 and 300
nBo 1 and 300
nMave 1 and 300
modelCompare AIC and BIC
ndec 4
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
36
.
19 19 20
.
12 12 15
.
5 6
35 21 16 23 14 13 16 13 11
35 21 16 23 14 13 16 13 11
26 13 13 26 14 14 17 11 10
54 30 5 35 18 15 25 22 16
54 30 5 36 19 10 25 23 16
35 20 16 35 21 18 33 21 17
36 20 16 36 21 17 33 21 17
42 19 19 42 19 19 28 20 17
50 26 19 51 26 19 47 29 23
48 29 19 49 29 19 46 30 22
48 29 19 49 29 19 46 30 22
62 31 2 63 30 2 62 36 1
96 3 <1 96 3 <1 98 2 <1
S10 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type
and the proportion of time spent at each true model, when AIC is the model comparison
statistic and noise-to-signal ratio is 1 : 4 in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 4),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by AIC. For Tess-, Mave-, and
Bo-dominant populations, three most visited models are shown. Numbers show time spent at each model in
percent points. True models are in red. Tess- and Mave-dominant populations capture the true model more
consistently than Bo-dominant populations.
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
64
.
18 13 75
.
9 8 72
.
9 7
63 23 6 71 10 8 47 24 12
65 20 7 73 9 9 45 27 12
54 9 9 65 9 9 29 16 16
75 20 1 82 8 3 77 7 5
76 20 1 82 8 3 76 7 5
58 11 9 68 11 11 29 20 20
59 10 10 68 11 10 29 21 19
68 12 11 70 11 11 30 22 21
64 12 9 69 12 10 38 33 25
68 12 9 71 12 9 36 34 26
67 13 9 70 13 9 36 33 27
60 24 4 62 24 4 57 38 2
96 7 <1 87 7 <1 95 4 <1
S11 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type
and the proportion of time spent at each true model, when SC is the model comparison
statistic and noise-to-signal ratio is 1 : 4 in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 4),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by SC. For Tess-, Mave-, and
Bo-dominant populations, three most visited models are shown. Numbers show time spent at each model in
percent points. True models are in red. Bo-dominant population spends much more time at the true model
under SC than under AIC.
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True
Model
Global Model (All, AIC)
1st 2nd 3rd
Global Model (All, SC)
1st 2nd 3rd
.
26
.
13 13 74
.
11 8
26 20 13 64 14 13
26 20 13 64 16 11
19 13 13 49 12 12
45 15 11 84 9 2
46 16 11 84 9 2
23 21 21 49 16 16
23 21 20 49 17 15
27 20 20 53 18 17
35 32 30 52 22 20
34 32 31 54 20 20
34 32 31 52 22 20
52 44 1 47 46 2
98 2 <1 93 5 <1
S12 Figure. The three most visited models by the epistemically diverse population for each true
model and when noise-to-signal ratio is 1 : 4 in a system with no replication. For
σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 4), proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model for an epistemically
diverse population. Three most visited models are shown for AIC and SC. Numbers show time spent at each
model in percent points. True models are in red. For both AIC and SC, all true models are in top three most
visited models.
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
36
.
19 19 19
.
12 12 15
.
10 10
34 20 15 22 14 13 16 13 11
34 19 15 22 14 13 16 13 11
23 10 10 22 13 13 17 10 10
48 30 4 32 18 12 23 19 14
48 29 4 31 18 12 23 19 14
28 20 9 29 16 16 26 18 15
27 19 9 28 16 15 26 17 15
22 13 13 31 16 16 26 18 16
19 12 11 33 18 13 36 25 21
23 14 13 34 19 13 36 25 21
22 14 12 33 18 13 36 25 21
25 15 9 34 19 11 46 31 6
34 13 6 47 18 7 72 14 4
S13 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type and
the proportion of time spent at each true model, when AIC is the model comparison statistic
and noise equals the signal in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 1), proportion of
time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by AIC. Three most visited models are shown.
Numbers show time spent at each model in percent points. True models are in red. Tess- and Mave-dominant
populations perform more poorly than they do under low error, however, they still spend more time at the true
model than any other models. Surprisingly, Bo-dominant population captures the true model more often now
than under low noise although it still performs relatively poorly as compared to other homogeneous populations.
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
63
.
17 17 73
.
9 9 70
.
8 8
47 19 13 58 10 10 39 23 11
47 19 13 59 10 10 39 23 11
28 16 16 37 10 10 22 13 13
51 16 11 55 12 9 60 9 7
50 16 12 53 12 9 58 9 7
24 22 10 32 11 11 24 15 15
23 21 11 31 11 11 24 15 15
16 13 12 34 11 11 25 16 15
12 11 11 26 12 11 27 18 17
15 14 11 26 12 12 27 18 18
15 13 10 25 12 12 27 18 18
10 9 9 21 12 11 30 26 10
10 9 9 22 14 10 48 16 7
S14 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type
and the proportion of time spent at each true model, when SC is the model comparison
statistic and noise equals signal in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 1),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by SC. Three most visited
models are shown. Numbers show time spent at each model in percent points. True models are in red. Under
SC and with this level of noise, Tess-dominant population performs more poorly than both Mave- and
Bo-dominant populations, spending much less time in the true model.
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True
Model
Global Model (All, AIC)
1st 2nd 3rd
Global Model (All, SC)
1st 2nd 3rd
.
26
.
13 13 72
.
10 10
25 19 12 49 14 10
25 19 12 49 14 11
16 11 11 25 10 10
43 17 9 63 10 8
42 16 9 61 10 9
21 15 15 25 16 10
20 15 15 24 15 10
22 16 16 26 11 11
25 23 21 22 12 11
26 23 22 23 12 11
26 23 22 23 12 11
33 33 8 23 16 10
63 15 5 31 13 8
S15 Figure. The three most visited models by the epistemically diverse population for each true
model and when noise equals signal in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 1),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model for an epistemically diverse population.
Three most visited models are shown for AIC and SC. Numbers show time spent at each model in percent
points. True models are in red. For epistemically diverse population, the true model is the most visited model,
for all true models except one under AIC and for all true models under SC. It spends more time in simpler
models under SC than under AIC.
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
37
.
19 19 20
.
12 12 15
.
10 10
26 25
.
11 15 11
.
10 12 10 9
26 25
.
11 15 11
.
10 12 10 9
20
.
18 18 12 10 10 10 8 7
25 21 11 13 11 10 14 11 8
26
.
21 11 12 12 10
.
14 11 8
21
.
17 16 9 9 9 12 10 8
21
.
17 16 9 9 9 12 9 8
21
.
17 17 10 10 9 12 9 8
22
.
16 15 9
.
9 9 13 9 9
22
.
16 16 9
.
9 9 13 9 9
22
.
17 16 9
.
9 9 13 9 9
23
.
16 15 9
.
8 8 14 10 8
24
.
16 16 10
.
9 9 16 9 8
S16 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type
and the proportion of time spent at each true model, when AIC is the model comparison
statistic and noise-to-signal ratio is 4 : 1 in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (4 : 1),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by AIC. Three most visited
models are shown. Numbers show time spent at each model in percent points. True models are in red. When
the level of noise in the system is extremely high, all heterogeneous populations but Bo-dominant fail to capture
the true model for many true models and spend little time at it overall. For Bo-dominant population, true
model is among top three most visited models across all true models.
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True
Model
Global Model
Tess Mave Bo
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
.
63
.
17 16 73
.
9 9 70
.
9 8
44 37 7 31 25 10 28 22 12
44 37 7 32 25 10 28 22 12
36 22 22 25 16 16 22 15 15
44 31 8 29 18 13 24 20 14
45 32 8 31 19 12 25 19 15
39 21 20 25 15 15 20 14 12
39 21 21 26 15 15 22 13 13
39 22 21 27 15 15 23 13 13
40 20 20 26 14 14 21 13 12
41 21 20 27 14 14 22 13 12
41 21 20 27 15 14 22 12 12
42 20 20 27 14 14 21 12 11
43 20 20 29 14 14 23 11 11
S17 Figure. The three most visited models for scientist populations with one dominant type and
the proportion of time spent at each true model, when SC is the model comparison statistic
and noise-to-signal ratio is 4 : 1 in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (4 : 1), proportion
of time spent by a model as the global given a true model, assessed by SC. Three most visited models are shown.
Numbers show time spent at each model in percent points. True models are in red. Under SC, the high
performance of Bo-dominant population is dampened and all homogeneous populations perform very poorly.
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True
Model
Global Model (All, AIC)
1st 2nd 3rd
Global Model (All, SC)
1st 2nd 3rd
.
26
.
13 13 73
.
10 10
18 15
.
12 39 28 9
18 15
.
12 39
.
28 9
12 12 11
.
31
.
18 18
17 14
.
12 36
.
20 14
16 14
.
13 38
.
21 12
12 12
.
11 31
.
16 15
12
.
11 11 33
.
17 16
12
.
12 12 33
.
17 17
12
.
10 10 33
.
15 15
12
.
11 11 33
.
16 15
12
.
11 10 34
.
16 15
12
.
10 10 34
.
14 14
13
.
10 10 36
.
15 15
S18 Figure. The three most visited models by the epistemically diverse population for each true
model and noise-to-signal ratio is 4 : 1 in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (4 : 1),
proportion of time spent by a model as the global given a true model for an epistemically diverse population.
Three most visited models are shown for AIC and SC. Numbers show time spent at each model in percent
points. True models are in red. When the system noise is high, even the epistemically diverse population cannot
prevent poor performance. True model is not captured for most models and most of the time, under both model
comparison statistics.
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S19 Figure. The true model stickiness when noise-to-signal ratio is 1 : 1 in a system with no
replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 1), stickiness of each true model as global model for each scientific
population (vertical axis) for AIC (A) and SC (B). The true model is still sticky when noise is set to be equal to
the signal in a system with no replication. True model is stickiest for Tess-dominant population (increasing with
complexity) and least sticky for Bo-dominant population under AIC. Under SC, true model stickiness is even
higher, and all populations perform comparably well.
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S20 Figure. The mean first passage time to true model when noise is set to be equal to the
signal in a system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (1 : 1), the mean first passage time from each
initial model (vertical axis) to each true model (horizontal axis) using AIC (A) and SC (B) as model comparison
statistics per scientist populations. All means epistemically diverse; all others dominant in one type.
Epistemically diverse population reaches truth fastest under both AIC and SC. Interestingly, under AIC
Bo-dominant population is the slowest to reach the truth whereas under SC, it is the Tess-dominant population,
especially when starting from complex initial models.
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S21 Figure. The true model stickiness when noise-to-signal ratio is 4 : 1 in a system with no
replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (4 : 1), stickiness of each true model as global model for each scientific
population (vertical axis) for AIC (A) and SC (B). In this scenario, we observe a substantial decrease in true
model stickiness, especially for complex models, both under AIC and SC. Level of noise in the system appears to
have a large effect on whether true model will stay as global model once it is hit. In such cases, Bo-dominant
population appears to perform better than other populations but still not as well as the cases with lower noise.
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S22 Figure. The mean first passage time to true model when noise-to-signal ratio is 4 : 1 in a
system with no replication. For σ2 : E(y|µx) = (4 : 1), the mean first passage time from each initial model
(vertical axis) to each true model (horizontal axis) using AIC (A) and SC (B) as model comparison statistics per
scientist populations. All means epistemically diverse; all others dominant in one type. Due to high variability
in this scenario, all values greater than 25 are set to 25 for purposes of illustration. Under high noise, the speed
with which the true model is hit is much lower, and the slowest when starting from complex initial models. In
this scenario, Bo-dominant population is the most efficient out of all four populations.
S23 Appendix. Reproducibility does not imply discovery of truth.
The rate of reproducibility is the probability of the global model staying the same model after a replication
experiment. In this section, we show that the rate of reproducibility has no effect on other desirable properties
of scientific discovery including: the probability that a model is selected as the global model in the long run, the
mean first time to hit a model, and stickiness of a model. The key observation for the result is that all of these
desirable properties of scientific discovery are properties of the stochastic process of scientific discovery defined
by the Markov chain. A Markov chain is characterized solely by its transition probability matrix. Below, we
show that the rate of reproducibility, does not affect the transition probability matrix in our model. Therefore,
any property of the Markov chain is not affected by the rate of reproducibility. To keep the notation tractable
and without loss of generality we assume that Rey, the replicator is not chosen consecutively in the process.
Generalization to the case where Rey is chosen consecutively is by induction and using Eq. (2).
When Rey, the replicator, is in the system, the model is a second order Markov chain, which has transitions
specified over two time steps. We let the triplet of indices (i, j, `) to be associated with a transition in this second
order Markov chain, where i is the beginning state and ` is the final transition state through state j. We let
RRey to be the replicator strategy and RRey′ to be any non-replicator strategy. P (RRey) = 1− P (RRey′) is the
probability that the second step is a replication experiment. The probability that the global model transitions to
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M` in the second step given that Mi was the beginning global model can be written as
P (RRey′)
L∑
j=1
pij` + P (RRey)
L∑
j=1
qij`, (6)
where pij` and qij` are transition probabilities when a replicator is not selected and is selected, respectively.
The first term in Eq. (6) does not involve a replicator so to establish whether the rate of reproducibility affects
transition probabilities it is sufficient to focus on the second term. There are only two nonzero terms in
∑L
j=1 qij`.
The first term is
qii` = P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (M`|Mi),
where on the right hand side: M` is proposed with probability P (M`|Mi) and wins against Mi with probability
P (S(M`) < S(Mi)) at the first step, and in the replication (second step) it wins again with probability
P (S(M`) < S(Mi)) to stay as the global model. The second term nonzero term is
qi`` = P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (S(M`) > S(Mi))P (M`|Mi),
where on the right hand side: M` is proposed with probability P (M`|Mi) and loses against Mi with probability
P (S(M`) > S(Mi)) at the first step, and in the replication (second step) it wins against Mi with probability
P (S(M`) < S(Mi)) to become the global model. Here, qii` and qi`` are the probabilities of reproducing and not
reproducing a result. Further, only their sum contributes to the Markov transition probability matrix (Eq. (6)).
We write
L∑
j=1
qij` = qii` + qi``
= P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (M`|Mi)
+ P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (S(M`) > S(Mi))P (M`|Mi)
= P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (M`|Mi)[P (S(M`) < S(Mi)) + P (S(M`) > S(Mi))],
where the first and second term within brackets determine whether a result is reproduced or not reproduced,
respectively, and sum to 1. Therefore we have
L∑
j=1
qij` = P (S(M`) < S(Mi))P (M`|Mi), (7)
which shows that whether a result is reproduced has no bearing on the calculation of transition probability
from Mi to M`. Since the transition probability matrix characterizes a Markov chain, the rate of reproducibility
cannot affect other desirable properties of scientific discovery including: the probability that a model is selected
as the global model in the long run, the mean first time to hit a model, and the stickiness of a model.
On the other hand, we do not claim that there cannot be correlation between desirable properties of scientific
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discovery and the rate of reproducibility. In fact, whether there is correlation depends on the strategies and
their frequency in the population, and this also can be seen from our mathematical result. For transition to M`
the rate of reproducibility is proportional to
∑
i 6=` P (S(M`) < S(Mi)) and the transition probability to M` is
proportional to P (S(M`) < S(Mi)). If the effect of the first term P (RRey′)
∑L
j=1 pij` in Eq. (6) and the second
term P (M`|Mi) in Eq. 7 are small then there might be considerable correlation between desirable properties of
scientific discovery and the rate of reproducibility. This relationship depends on a number of factors including
the exact strategies of scientists in the population and the frequency of these scientists, and is very complex.
S24 Appendix. Correlations per scientist population.
Table 3. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients between rate of reproducibility and other desirable
properties of scientific discovery for each scientist population. Overall is averaged over all scientist populations.
rSR Overall Rey Tess Mave Bo All equal
Time spent at -0.02 0.41 0.35 0.69 -0.06 0.59
true model
Mean first passage 0.26 0.03 0.023 -0.13 0.03 -0.06
time to true model
Stickiness 0.55 0.74 0.87 0.76 -0.03 0.82
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S25 Figure. A comparison of all five scientist populations in ABM on three properties of
scientific discovery in a system with replication. Violin plots showing marginal effects of scientist
populations on first passage time to true model (A), proportion of times true model is global model (B), and
true model stickiness (C). While different homogeneous populations appear to perform better/worse on different
properties, epistemically diverse population (indicated by All) appears to have lowest variability across outcomes.
S26 Appendix. ABM with soft research strategies.
Table 4. Median and IQR of the mean (over 100 replications for each parameter set) first passage time to true
model calculated over runs with different model parameters for ABM with soft research strategies.
Rey Tess Mave Bo All equal
Median 815 80 16 18 25
IQR 1686 620 36.25 40 46
Mean first passage time to true model is faster for Tess- and Bo-dominant populations when scientists in
the ABM simulations pursue soft (vs. hard) research strategies, consistent with results from Markov chain
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without replicator. The median of the mean first passage time for Mave-dominant population is the same as the
median we reported for ABM with hard research strategies because the maverick strategy has a well connected
transition matrix, leading to quick discovery of the true model. Further, the representation of Maves in the
epistemically diverse population makes this population also well connected, in ABM with both hard and soft
research strategies. Rey-dominant populations are the slowest to discover the truth because when replicators
comprise 99% of the population, there are not many new models being proposed and same experiments are
repeated many times slowing down the discovery of the true model.
S27 Figure. Interaction of model comparison statistics with true model complexity (A) and
with error variance to model expectation ratio (B) on time spent at the true model in a system
with replication. (A) Violin plots for proportion of times true model is global model per model comparison
statistic and complexity of true model. (B) Violin plots for proportion of times the true model is global model
per model comparison statistic and the ratio of error variance to model expectation. Scientist populations spend
more time at the true model under SC than AIC when the model is simple or when error variance to model
expectation ratio is low (1 : 4). Time spent at true model decreases and difference between AIC and SC
disappears as model complexity or error variance to model expectation ratio increases.
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S28 Figure. All properties of scientific discovery as a function of true model complexity in a
system with replication. Violin plots showing marginal effects of true model complexity on first mean
passage time to true model (A), proportion of times the true model is global model (B), stickiness (C), and the
rate of reproducibility (D). Complexity does not appear to have a substantial direct effect on any property and
most of its effect comes through interactions with other model parameters.
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